COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA Present: Judges Baker, Annunziata and Senior Judge Hodges Argued at Norfolk, Virginia STEVEN L. ROMINE OPINION BY v. Record No. 1356-95-1 JUDGE ROSEMARIE ANNUNZIATA JULY 30, 1996 KAREN A. ROMINE FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF VIRGINIA BEACH A. Bonwill Shockley, Judge Morris H. Fine (Fine, Fine, Legum & Fine, on brief), for appellant. Debra C. Albiston (Cynthia E. Cordle; Kaufman & Canoles, on brief), for appellee. Appellant, Steven L. Romine ("husband"), appeals a decree of the Circuit Court of the City of Virginia Beach ("circuit court") affirming, inter alia, the jurisdiction of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations District Court of the City of Virginia Beach ("J&DR court") to reinstate an order of spousal support in favor of appellee, Karen A. Romine ("wife"), which the circuit court initially entered and subsequently abated. We find that the J&DR court lacked jurisdiction to reinstate the support order and, therefore, reverse. I. Husband and wife were divorced by decree entered in the circuit court on September 3, 1991. The decree awarded spousal support to wife in the amount of $900 per month. The decree also transferred to the J&DR court all matters pertaining to the enforcement, modification, or revision of the support award. On March 11, 1994, husband filed a petition in the circuit court to reduce the support award on the ground that he was then unemployed. On March 18, 1994, the parties agreed to abate support payments beginning in April 1994. The agreement was incorporated into a decree of the circuit court entered November 14, 1994. The November decree ordered husband to advise counsel of his return to employment and allowed wife to petition for reinstatement of support. The November decree did not again transfer the matter to the J&DR court. On December 7, 1994, wife petitioned the J&DR court to reinstate spousal support on the ground that husband had gained employment in June 1994. On March 16, 1995, the J&DR court reinstated support in the amount of $900 per month effective June 1, 1994. Husband noted his appeal, and the J&DR court set a $5,000 bond with surety, which husband failed to post. Husband petitioned the circuit court to permit his appeal without posting the bond. However, the circuit court entered a decree, denying husband's motion on the ground that it did not have jurisdiction and that the J&DR court had jurisdiction to require the bond. Implicit in the circuit court's ruling is a finding that the J&DR court had jurisdiction to reinstate the support order. On appeal, husband contends, inter alia, that the circuit court's exercise of jurisdiction in entering the decree abating the support order divested the J&DR court of jurisdiction to act further. We agree. II. Code  20-79(c) grants authority to a circuit court to transfer to a J&DR court "matters pertaining to support and maintenance for the spouse" after the entry of a decree of divorce. A circuit court's transfer of such matters to a J&DR court creates concurrent jurisdiction in each court. Crabtree v. Crabtree, 17 Va. App. 81, 86, 435 S.E.2d 883, 887 (1993). The circuit court retains its continuing jurisdiction to modify custody and support matters pursuant to Code  20-108, -109. See id. However, although a circuit court retains continuing jurisdiction following a transfer pursuant to Code  20-79(c), it does not follow that a J&DR court similarly retains jurisdiction pursuant to such a transfer once the circuit court again exercises its jurisdiction in the case. Indeed, for the following reasons, we hold that it does not. First, the statute does not extend continuing jurisdiction over matters of custody and support to J&DR courts. Cf. Code  20-108, -109; Crabtree, 17 Va. App. at 86, 435 S.E.2d 887 (discussing statutory authority providing for continuing jurisdiction in the circuit court). Rather, the statutory scheme provides the circuit courts such jurisdiction and the authority to transfer to the J&DR courts jurisdiction over limited matters. The J&DR court's jurisdiction exists only as a result of action taken by a circuit court. Second, the cessation of a J&DR court's concurrent jurisdiction upon a circuit court's exercise of its continuing jurisdiction is consistent with the statutory scheme. See Code  20-79(a); Code  16.1-241, -244; Rochelle v. Rochelle, 225 Va. 387, 391-92, 302 S.E.2d 59, 62 (1983); Martin v. Bales, 7 Va. App. 141, 145, 371 S.E.2d 823, 825-26 (1988). As these provisions demonstrate, the jurisdiction that a J&DR court shares concurrently with a circuit court terminates, as a matter of law, upon the circuit court's assumption of jurisdiction. There is no authority supporting the proposition that a J&DR court's jurisdiction does not similarly terminate when its jurisdiction is obtained pursuant to Code  20-79(c). Third, a circuit court's assumption of jurisdiction after transfer to a J&DR court conclusively determines that the matter will be litigated in a court of record. It follows that the circuit court intends to preclude the J&DR court from acting on that issue. See Crabtree, 17 Va. App. at 87, 435 S.E.2d at 887. Finally, the cessation of a J&DR court's jurisdiction under such circumstances is consistent with the policy considerations underlying the relevant statutes. See id. at 86-87, 435 S.E.2d at 887. These considerations include the legislative intent that the circuit courts retain full jurisdictional power as provided by statute, notwithstanding the concurrent jurisdiction of the J&DR court. See id. at 86, 435 S.E.2d at 887. To effectively implement that legislative intent, the circuit court's jurisdiction must, of necessity, encompass the power not only to reinstate a case earlier transferred to a J&DR court and adjudicate all relevant issues, see id. at 87, 435 S.E.2d at 887, but also the power to decide which court is the more appropriate forum for any necessary review, modification, and enforcement of its orders resolving the new issues. Any divestment of a circuit court's jurisdictional power to address and decide matters properly before it must emanate not from the parties or the J&DR court, but by act of the circuit court pursuant to Code  20-79(c), with specific reference to the matters to be transferred. To invest in a J&DR court the power to review, modify, or enforce orders of a circuit court in the absence of such a mandate would undermine the structure and authority of judicial process. Accordingly, we hold that a circuit court's assumption of jurisdiction over a support matter subsequent to its transfer pursuant to Code  20-79(c) divests a J&DR court of jurisdiction. Thus, the J&DR court in this case had no jurisdiction to reinstate the support order which the circuit court had previously abated. For the foregoing reasons, the decree of the circuit court is reversed and the order of the J&DR court vacated. Reversed and vacated.