COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA


Present:  	Judges Frank, Kelsey and Senior Judge Willis
Argued at Richmond, Virginia


ROBERT KEITH ENGLISH
			OPINION BY
v.	Record No. 1487-03-2	JUDGE JERE M.H. WILLIS, JR.
	JUNE 22, 2004
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA


	FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF CHESTERFIELD COUNTY
Herbert C. Gill, Jr., Judge

		Peter A. Nikas (Nikas & Powers, on brief), for appellant.

		Margaret W. Reed, Assistant Attorney General (Jerry W. Kilgore, 
Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.


	On appeal from his conviction of impersonating a law enforcement officer, in violation of 
Code  18.2-174, Robert Keith English contends the evidence was insufficient to prove he falsely 
assumed or exercised the functions, powers, duties, or privileges incident to law enforcement 
officers or falsely pretended to be a law enforcement officer.  English argues he was acting within 
the power and authority conferred on him as a fugitive recovery agent by Code  19.2-149.  We 
affirm the judgment of the trial court.
BACKGROUND
	"On appeal, 'we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, 
granting to it all reasonable inferences fairly deducible therefrom.'"  Archer v. Commonwealth, 
26 Va. App. 1, 11, 492 S.E.2d 826, 831 (1997) (citation omitted).  "In its role of judging witness 
credibility, the fact finder is entitled to disbelieve the self-serving testimony of the accused and 
to conclude that the accused is lying to conceal his guilt."  Marable v. Commonwealth, 27        
Va. App. 505, 509-10, 500 S.E.2d 233, 235 (1998).  The trier of fact is not required to accept a 
party's evidence in its entirety, Barrett v. Commonwealth, 231 Va. 102, 107, 341 S.E.2d 190, 
193 (1986), but is free to believe or disbelieve, in whole or in part, the testimony of any witness,  
Rollston v. Commonwealth, 11 Va. App. 535, 547, 399 S.E.2d 823, 830 (1991).  Thus, the trial 
court was entitled to disbelieve English's self-serving testimony and to resolve any evidentiary 
conflict in favor of the Commonwealth.  Further, 
[w]hen a defendant challenges on appeal the sufficiency of the 
evidence to sustain his convictions, it is the appellate court's duty 
to examine the evidence that tends to support the convictions and 
to permit the convictions to stand unless they are plainly wrong or 
without evidentiary support.  If there is evidence to support the 
convictions, the reviewing court is not permitted to substitute its 
own judgment, even if its opinion might differ from the 
conclusions reached by the finder of fact at the trial.

Commonwealth v. Jenkins, 255 Va. 516, 520, 499 S.E.2d 263, 265 (1998) (citations omitted).  
	The evidence disclosed that English was a fugitive recovery agent who possessed a bail 
piece commanding the arrest and surrender of Terrence Adams, a fugitive on a warrant charging 
attempted murder.  English had information that Adams could be found late at night on 
Brandermill Parkway, riding in a metallic-colored Honda Accord with personalized license 
plates driven by a woman.  On the subject occasion, Elizabeth Matthews was driving a car 
similar to the one described.  She had a male passenger.  English got behind Matthews' vehicle 
and signaled with his headlights and a flashlight.  Matthews testified she saw flashing lights and 
a spotlight being shined into her vehicle.  She pulled over, believing the police were stopping 
her.
	After Matthews stopped, English approached the driver's side of her car.  He was 
wearing around his neck a gold badge that stated "special investigations unit."  Matthews 
testified that it "looked like a police badge."  Matthew's passenger, Romy Baassiri, testified that 
English announced that he was a special agent with the violent crimes unit and asked him and 
Matthews for identification.  Matthews handed English her operator's license.  English asked 
Matthews whether she had been drinking alcohol and whether she had any weapons or drugs in 
her car.  He then asked her to step out of her car.  He again asked whether she had been drinking 
and said that he could help her out if she told the truth.  Matthews had not been drinking and told 
English she was just tired.  She told him she recognized him from their neighborhood.  English 
then told her he was a fugitive recovery agent and that she and her passenger were not connected 
with the person for whom he was looking. 
ANALYSIS
	Code  18.2-174 provides that no person "shall falsely assume or exercise the functions, 
powers, duties and privileges incident to the office of sheriff, police officer, marshal, or other 
peace officer, or . . . shall falsely assume or pretend to be any such officer."  English was a 
fugitive recovery agent, who derived his powers from Code  19.2-149.   He possessed a bail 
piece commanding the arrest and surrender of Adams.  He had information as to how to find 
Adams.  While stopping Matthews' car, identifying its occupants, and inquiring as to the 
presence of weapons might have been consistent with his information and the performance of his 
duties, his other actions exceeded the scope of his authority.  He wore a misleading badge 
representing that he was part of a "special investigations unit" of a law enforcement body.  He 
stated he was with a "violent crimes unit," further suggesting he was part of a law enforcement 
body.  Neither Matthews nor Baassiri matched the description of the people for whom he was 
searching.  Nevertheless, English detained Matthews, interrogated her about whether she had 
been drinking and encouraged her to tell him the truth so he could "help" her.  These actions 
were unrelated to his duties as a fugitive recovery agent and suggested that he was a law 
enforcement officer.  It was not until Matthews recognized English that his questioning ceased 
and he identified himself as a fugitive recovery agent.  These facts support the trial court's 
finding that English falsely assumed or pretended to be a law enforcement officer and 
sufficiently proved beyond a reasonable doubt that he violated Code  18.2-174.
	Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
											       Affirmed.
  Code  19.2-149 states

A surety on a bond in a recognizance may at any time arrest his 
principal and surrender him to the court before which the 
recognizance was taken or before which such principal's 
appearance is required, or to the sheriff, sergeant or jailer of the 
county or city wherein the court before which such principal's 
appearance is required is located; in addition to the above 
authority, upon the application of the surety, the court, or the clerk 
thereof, before which the recognizance was taken, or before which 
such principal's appearance is required, shall issue a capias for the 
arrest of such principal, and such capias may be executed by such 
surety, or his authorized agent, or by any sheriff, sergeant or police 
officer, and the person executing such capias shall deliver such 
principal and such capias to the sheriff or jailer of the county or the 
sheriff, sergeant or jailer of the city in which the appearance of 
such principal is required, and thereupon the said surety shall be 
discharged from liability for any act of the principal subsequent 
thereto. . . .


 
 


 
 
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