why the statutes must be read together. Because the parties concede that the victim's body was located in "the City of Richmond, but within [one] mile of the Chesterfield [County] Border," we must treat the homicide as if it occurred there. That conclusion renders this case straightforward. If Code § 19.2-250 permits prosecution in Chesterfield County for offenses committed in the City of Richmond but within the one-mile border (which appellant concedes), then it must also permit prosecution in Chesterfield County for those offenses that Code § 19.2-247 treats *as if they were committed* within the same area.[6] In either case, the relevant code sections make the offense amenable to prosecution in Chesterfield County. Thus, when we construe together Code §§ 19.2-247 and 19.2-250(B), it is plain that Chesterfield County was the appropriate venue in which to prosecute appellant.

Because we find that Code §§ 19.2-247 and 19.2-250 when read together permit prosecution of appellant in Chesterfield County, we affirm the trial court.

Affirmed.

[6] Appellant dismisses such reasoning, contending that construing together Code §§ 19.2-247 and 19.2-250 enlarges the authority of Chesterfield County to prosecute criminal cases under Code § 19.2-250, in violation of the "cardinal principle of law" that penal statutes are to be strictly construed. Code § 19.2-250, however, is not penal in nature. See Kitze v. Commonwealth, 23 Va. App. 213, 216, 475 S.E.2d 830, 832 (1996) ("'If [a] statute imposes a disability for the purpose of punishment – that is, to reprimand the wrongdoer, to deter others, etc., it has been considered penal.'" (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 96 (1958) (plurality opinion))). Rather, the statute simply prescribes Chesterfield County's jurisdiction involving criminal cases as extending one mile into the City of Richmond from its border with Chesterfield County. Thus, this "cardinal principle of law" is not applicable.